This report examines how intergovernmental service agreements (ISAs) enable federal, state, and local agencies to share criminal justice data. It catalogues the major databases used by the FBI, NCIC, ATF, CID, and partner agencies, and highlights the legal and technical frameworks that govern access and oversight.
Overview of Intergovernmental Service Agreements
Intergovernmental Service Agreements (ISAs) are formal contracts—often memoranda of understanding (MOUs) or CJIS User Agreements—that authorize resource, data, and tool sharing across federal, state, tribal, and local law enforcement agencies. ISAs establish roles, security requirements, and audit processes to ensure data integrity and lawful use, while defining how agencies interface with FBI Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) systems.
Key Agencies and Their Roles
- FBI CJIS Division: Central authority for national criminal justice information exchange, managing network infrastructure and core databases.
- NCIC (National Crime Information Center): Operates under FBI CJIS as the primary real-time index of criminal records, warrants, stolen property, and missing persons.
- ATF (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives): Contributes firearms and explosives case data; participates in joint task forces that leverage CJIS and NCIC databases.
- CID (Army Criminal Investigation Division): Military investigative arm that uploads and retrieves personnel and crime data via NCIC and CJIS networks.
- State & Local Law Enforcement: End-users and data providers for federal systems; required to sign CJIS Security Policy agreements to access NCIC, N-DEx, and other tools.
Technical Backbone: CJIS WAN & Connection Agreements
Access to federal databases is provisioned through the CJIS Wide Area Network (WAN). Agencies must execute the FBI’s Interagency Connection Agreement (ICA-D4), which details:
- Appointment of Interface Agency Officials to oversee compliance and training.
- Mandatory adherence to the CJIS Security Policy (Title 28 CFR Part 20).
- Regular security audits and incident reporting procedures.
Major Databases and Systems
| Database / System | Managing Agency | Purpose & Data | Access Mechanism |
|---|---|---|---|
| NCIC (National Crime Information Center) | FBI CJIS | Criminal histories, wanted persons, stolen property, missing persons | CJIS WAN via JWIN or state RMS |
| IAFIS / NGI (Automated Fingerprint & Biometric) | FBI CJIS | Fingerprints, palmprints, iris scans, facial recognition data | JABS; CAS terminals |
| N-DEx (National Data Exchange) | FBI CJIS | Case file metadata, incident reports for networked queries | Secure CJIS WAN interface |
| UCR & NIBRS (Crime Reporting Programs) | FBI CJIS | Aggregate crime statistics and detailed incident data | Electronic submission via CJIS portals |
| NICS (Instant Background Check System) | FBI CJIS | Firearms purchase eligibility checks | JWIN interface |
| JABS (Joint Automated Booking System) | DOJ JCIS | Arrest booking data, identity verification via NGI | NGI-integrated agency terminals |
| JWIN (Justice Web Interface to NCIC) | DOJ JCIS | Web-based queries for NCIC, III, NICS, Nlets | Secure web portal |
| Nlets (International Justice & Public Safety Net) | DOJ JCIS | Interstate exchange of driver, vehicle, and criminal records | Integrated through JWIN or state portals |
| CAS (Civil Applicant Systems) | DOJ JCIS | Electronic fingerprint capture for employment and clearance checks | CAS kiosks or terminals |
| Identity History Summary Checks | FBI CJIS | Comprehensive RAP sheets summarizing criminal history | Public request services; CJIS portals |
Surveillance, Secrecy, and Patriot Act Implications
Although ISAs themselves are administrative, they dovetail with Patriot Act authorities when terrorism or national security is invoked. Past provisions (e.g., Section 215 bulk collection) have indirectly fed CJIS databases. Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) operate under both ISA frameworks and Patriot Act mandates, sometimes using sealed warrants and gag orders that obscure the origin of evidence from defense counsel and the public.
Legal and Ethical Concerns
- Due Process Risks: Defendants may not learn the provenance of evidence derived from federal surveillance shared via ISAs.
- Transparency Gaps: Many MOUs, audit reports, and security plans remain undisclosed or redacted under national security exemptions.
- Oversight Deficits: While the FBI conducts internal audits, there is limited independent or judicial review of ISA compliance and data misuse.
For further research, one could file FOIA requests for specific CJIS‐ISA documents, analyze audit findings, or examine case law on evidence admissibility tied to interagency data sharing. If you need templates or strategic advice on accessing these records, let me know.
LeRoy Nellis 